International Law Studies – Volume 46
International Law Documents
U.S. Naval War College (Editor)

The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily of the U.S.
government, the U.S. Department of the Navy or the Naval War College.

76
2. International Military Tribunal for the Far East,
.Judgment, 4-12 November 1948 (Excerpts)
NoTE . The trial of those accused in Indictment No. 1 on 3 May 1946
Pleas of "not guilty" were entered for all the defendants. Evidence was heard
between 3 June 1946 and 10 February 1948; 419 witnesses testified in court, and
4, 336 exhibits and depositions and affidavits of 779 witnesses were admitted
in evidence. Defendants Matsuoka and Nagano died during the course of the
trial, and the indictment of the defendant Okawa was suspended by reason of
his insanity. The judgment of the Tribunal was read by the President of the
Tribunal, Sir William Webb, from 4 to 12 November 1948. The Indian Member of the Tribunal dissented, the French and Netherlands Members dissented
in part, the Philippine Member wrote a separate concurring opinion, and the
President filed a separate statement of reasons. The Tribunal's judgment was
published at Tokyo in six fascicules with a total of 1,218 pages, and an annex
of 130 pages.

PART A
CHAPTER

1.

EsTABLISHMENT AND PROCEEDINGS OF
THE TRIBUNAL

[The Tribunal summarized the instruments under which it was established
an:d the course of its proceedings.]

CHAPTER

II.

THE LAW

(a) jurisdiction of the Tribunal
In our opinion the law of the Charter is decisive
and binding on the Tribunal. This is a special tribunal set up by the Supreme Commander under
authority conferred on him by the Allied Powers.
It derives its jurisdiction from the Charter. In this
trial its members have no jurisdiction except such as
is to be found in the Charter. The Order of the Supreme Commander, which appointed the members
of the Tribunal, states: "The responsibilities, powers,
and duties of the members of the Tribunal are set
forth in the Charter thereof . . . " In the result, the
members of the Tribunal, being otherwise wholly
without power in respect to the trial of the accused,
have been empowered by the documents, which constituted the Tribunal and appointed tnem as

77
members, to try the accused but subject always to
the duty and responsibility of applying to the trial
the law set forth in the Charter
The foregoing expression of opinion is not to be
taken as supporting the view, if such view be held,
that the Allied Powers or any victor nations have the
right under international law in providing for the
trial and punishment of war criminals to enact or
promulgate laws or vest in their tribunals powers in
conflicts with recognised international law or rules or
principles thereof In the exercise of their right to
create tribunals for such a purpose and in conferring
powers upon such tribunals belligerent powers may
act only within the limits of international lavv
The substantial grounds of the defence challenge
to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to hear and adjudicate upon the charges contained in the Indictment
are the following:
(1) The Allied Powers acting through the Supreme
" ~ommander have no authority to include in the
!C harter of the Tribunal and to designate as justiciable "Crimes against Peace" (Article 5 (a));
(2) Aggressive war is not per se illegal and the Pact
of Paris of 1928 renouncing war as an instrument of
national policy does not enlarge the meaning of war
crimes nor constitute war a crime;
(3) War is the act of a nation for which there is
no individual responsibility under international law;
(4) The provisions of the Charter are "ex post
fas=to" legislation and therefore illegal;
(5) The Instrument of Surrender which provides
that the Declaration of Potsdam will be given effect
imposes the condition that Conventional War Crimes
as recognised by international law at the date of the
Declaration (26 July, 1945) would be the only crimes
prosecuted;
(6) Killings in the course of belligerent operations
0

0

0
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except in so far as they constitute violations of the
rules of warfare or the laws and customs of war are
the normal incidents of war and are not murder;
(7) Several of the accused being prisoners of war
are triable by court martial as provided by the
Geneva Convention 1929 and not by this Tribunal.
Since the law of the Charter is decisive and binding
upon it this Tribunal is formally bound to reject
the first four of the above seven contentions advanced
for the Defence but in view of the great importance
of the questions of law involved the Tribunal will
record its opinion on these questions.
After this Tribunal had in May 1946 dismissed
the defence motions and upheld the validity of its
Charter and its jurisdiction thereunder, stating that
the reasons for this decision would be given later, the
International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg delivered its verdicts on the first of October
1946. That Tribunal expressed inter alia the followIng opinions:
The Charter is not an arbitrary exercise of power on the part
of the victorious nations but is the expression of internationa 1
law existing at the time of its creation;
The question is what ·was the legal effect of this pact (Pact of
Paris August 27, 1928)? The Nations who signed the pact or
adhered to it unconditionally condemned recourse to war for
the future as an instrument of policy and expressly renounced it.
After the signing of the pact any nation resorting to war as an
instrument of national policy breaks the pact. In the opinion
of the Tribunal, the solemn renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy necessarily involves the proposition
that such a war is illegal in international law; and that those who
plan and wage such a war, with its inevitable and terrible consequences, are committing a crime in so doing.
The principle of international law which under certain circumstances protects the representative of a state cannot be applied
to acts which are condemned as criminal by international law.
The authors of these acts cannot shelter themselves behind their
official position in order to be freed from punishment in a ppropriate proceedings.
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The maxim "nullum crimen sine lege" is not a limitation of
sovereignty but is in general a principle of justice. To assert
that it is unjust to punish those who in defiance of treaties and
assurances have attacked neighboring states without warning
is obviously untrue for in such circumstances the attacker must
know that he is doing wrong, and so far from it being unjust to
punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go
unpunished.
The Charter specifically provides ... "the fact that a defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a
superior shall not free him from responsibility but may be
considered in mitigation of punishment." This provision is in
conformity with the laws of all nations . . . The true test which
is found in varying degrees in the criminal law of most nations
is not the existence of the order but whether moral choice was
in fact possible.

With the foregoing opinions of the Nuremberg
Tribunal and the reasoning by which they are reached
this Tribunal is in complete accord. They embody
complete answers to the first four of the grounds
urged by the defence as set forth above. In view of
the fact that in all rna terial respects the Charters of
this Tribunal and the Nuremberg Tribunal are identical, this Tribunal prefers to express its unqualified
adherence to the relevant opinions of the Nuremberg
Tribunal rather than by reasoning the matters anew
in somewhat different language to open the door to
controversy by way of conflicting interpretations of
the two statements of opinions.
The fifth ground of the Defence challenge to the
Tribunal's jurisdiction is that under the Instrument
of Surrender and the Declaration of Potsdam the
otily crimes for which it was contemplated that proceedings would be taken, being the only war crimes
recognized by international law at the date of the
Declaration of Potsdam, are Conventional War
Crimes as mentioned in Article 5 (b) of the Charter.
Aggressive war was a crime at international law
long prior to the date of the Declaration of Potsdam,

80
and there is no ground for the limited interpretation
of the Charter which the defense seek to give it.
A special argument was advanced that in any
event the Japanese Government, when they agreed
to accept the terms of the Instrument of Surrender,
did not in fact understand that those Japanese who
were alleged to be responsible for the war would be
prosecuted.
There is no basis in fact for this argument. It has
been established to the satisfaction of the Tribunal
that before the signature of the Instrument of Surrender the point in question had been considered by the
Japanese Government and the then members of the
Government, who advised the acceptance of the
terms of the Instrument of Surrender, anticipated
that those alleged to be responsible for the war would
be put on trial. As early as the lOth of August,
1945, three weeks before the signing of the Instrument of Surrender, the Emperor said to the accused
Kido, "I could not bear the sight . . . of those responsible for the war being punished ... but I think
now is the time to bear the unbearable."
The sixth contention for the Defence; namely, that
relating to the charges which allege the commission
of murder will be discussed at a later point.
The seventh of these contentions is made on behalf
of the four accused who surrendered as prisoners of
war-Itagaki, Kimura, Muto and Sato. The submission made on their behalf is that they, being
former members of the armed forces of Japan and
prisoners of war, are triable as such by court martial
under the articles of the Geneva Convention of 1929
relating to prisoners of war, particularly Articles 60
and 63, and not by a tribunal constituted otherwise
than under that Convention. This very point was
decided by the Supreme Court of the United States of
America in the Yamashita case. The late Chief
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Justice Stone, delivering the judgment for the majority of the Court said: "We think it clear from the
context of these recited provisions that Part 3 and
Article 63, which it contains, apply only to judicjal
proceedings directed against a prisoner of war for
offences committed while a prisoner of war. Section
V gives no indication that this part was design a ted to
deal with offences other than those referred to in
Parts 1 and 2 of Chapter 3 ." With that conclusion
and the reasoning by which it is reached the Tribunal
respectfully agrees.
The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
wholly fails.

(b) Responsibilz.ty for War Crimes
Against Prisoners
Prisoners taken in war and civilian internees are
in the power of the Government which captures them.
This was not always the case. For the last two centuries, however, this position has been recognised
and the customary law to this effect was formally
embodied in the Hague Convention No. IV in 1907
and repeated in the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 1929. Responsibility for the care of prisoners
of war and of civilian internees (all of whom we will
refer to as "prisoners") rests therefore with the Government having them in possession. This responsibility is not limited to the duty of mere maintenance
but extends to the prevention of mistreatment. In
particular, acts of inhumanity to prisoners which are
forbidden by the customary law of nations as well as
by conventions are to be prevented by the Government having responsibility for the prisoners.
In the discharge of these duties to prisoners Governments must have resort to persons. Indeed the
Governments responsible, in this sense, are those
persons who direct and control the functions of

82
Government. In this case and in the above regard
we are concerned with the members of the Japanese
Cabinet. The duty to prisoners is not a meaningless
obligation cast upon a political abstraction. It is a
specific duty to be performed in the first case by those
persons who constitute the Government. In the
multitude of duties and tasks involved in modern
government there is of necessity an elaborate system
of subdivision and delegation of duties. In the case
of the duty of Governments to prisoners held by them
in time of war those persons who constitute the Government have the principal and continuing responsibility for their prisoners, even though they delegate
the duties of maintenance and protection to others.
In general the responsibility for prisoners held by
Japan may be stated to have rested upon:
(1) Members of the Government;
(2) Military or Naval Officers in command of
formations having prisoners in their possession;
(3) Officials in those departments which were
concerned with the well-being of prisoners;
(4) Officials, whether civilian, military, or
naval, having direct and immediate control of
prisoners.
It is the duty of all those on whom responsibility
rests to secure proper treatment of prisoners and to
prevent their ill-treatment by establishing and securing the continuous and efficient working of a
system appropriate for these purposes. Such persons fail in this duty and become responsible for
ill-treatment of prisoners if:
(1) They fail to establish such a system.
(2) If having established such a system, they
fail to secure its continued and efficient working.
Each of such persons has a duty to ascertain that
the system is working and if he neglects to do so he
is responsible. He does not discharge his duty by
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merely instituting an appropriate system and thereafter neglecting to learn of its application. An Army
Commander or a Minister of War, for example, must
be at the same pains to ensure obedience to his orders
in this respect as he would in respect of other orders
he has issued on matters of the first importance.
Nevertheless, such persons are not responsible if a
proper system and its continuous efficient functioning
be provided for and conventional war crimes be committed unless:
(1) They had knowledge that such crimes were
being committed, and having such knowledge
they failed to take such steps as were within
their power to prevent the commission of such
crimes in the future, or
(2) They are at fault in having failed to acquire such knowledge.
If, such a person had, or should, but for negligence
or supineness, have had such knowledge he is not
excused for inaction if his Office required or permitted
him to take any action to prevent such crimes. On
the other hand it is not enough for the exculpation of
a person, otherwise responsible, for him to show that
he accepted assurances from others more directly
associated with the control of the prisoners if having
regard to the position of those others, to the frequency of reports of such crimes, or to any other
circumstances he should have been put upon further
enquiry as to whether those assurance~ were true or
untrue. That crimes are notorious, numerous and
widespread as to time and place are matters to be
considered in imputing knowledge.
A member of a Cabinet which collectively, as one
of the principal organs of the Government, is responsible for the care of prisoners is not absolved
from responsibility if, having knowledge of the
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commiSSion of the crimes in the sense already discussed, and omitting or failing to secure the taking of
measures to prevent the commission of such crimes in
the future, he elects to continue as a member of the
Cabinet. This is the position even though the Department of which he has the charge is not directly
concerned with the care of prisoners. A Cabinet
member may resign. If he has knowledge of illtreatment of prisoners, is powerless to prevent future
ill-treatment, but elects to remain in the Cabinet
thereby continuing to participate in its collective
responsibility for protection of prisoners he willingly
assumes responsibility for any ill-treatment in the
future.
Army or Navy Commanders can, by order, secure
proper treatment and prevent ill-treatment of prisoners. So can Ministers of War and of the Navy. If
crimes are committed against prisoners under their
control, of the likely occurrence of which they had,
or should have had knowledge in advance, they are
responsible for those crimes. If, for example, it be
shown that within the units under his command conventional war crimes have been committed of which
he knew or should have known, a commander who
takes no adequate steps to prevent the occurrence of
such crimes in the fut.ure -vvill be responsible for such
future crimes.
Departmental Officials having knowledge of illtreatment of prisoners are not responsible by reason
of their failure to resign; but if their functions included the administration of the system of protection
of prisoners and if they had or should have had
knowledge of crimes and did nothing effective, to the
extent of their powers, to prevent their occurrence in
the future then they are responsible for such future
crimes.
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(c) The Indictment
[The Tribunal gave its reasons for abstaining from
consideration of certain counts in the indictment.
Counts 6 to 17, which charged the planning and
preparation of wars of aggression and wars in violation of in tern a tional law, treaties, agreements and
assurances, were not considered because the Tribunal
found it unnecessary in respect to those defendants
who were found guilty of conspiracy (charged in
Counts 1 to 5) to enter convictions also for planning
and preparing. Counts 18 to 26, which charged the
initiation of a war of aggression and a war in violation
of international law, treaties, agreements and assurances, were not considered because the offense of
initiating such wars was included in the offense of
-vvaging them, alleged in Counts 27 to 36. Counts 39
to 43 and 44 to 52, which charged the unlawful killing and murdering of various persons by unlawfully
ordering, causing and permitting the armed forces of
Japan to make certain attacks, were not considered
because these murders were part of the offenses of unlawfully wagin.g war alleged in Counts 27 to 36.
·-

[The Tribunal held it had no jurisdiction under the Charter to consider Counts
37, 38, 44 and 52, which charged conspiracy to murder and to commit crimes
in breach of the laws of war. Article 5 (a) of the Charter gave jurisdiction over
conspiracy to commit crimes against peace, but Article 5 (b) and (c) were held
not to give jurisdiction of conspiracies to commit conventional war crimes and
crimes against humanity; a reference in Article 5 (c) to "a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes" was held to refer exclusively to
conspiracies to commit crimes against peace.]

CHAPTER

III.

OBLIGATIONs AssuMED

AND RIGHTS AcQUIRED BY jAPAN
[The Tribunal made a detailed study of the international rights and obligations
of Japan relevant to the indictment. It stated that these obligations form a
background against which the actions of the accused as should be viewed and
judged; later in the opinion it held that wars of aggression having been proved,
it was unnecessary to consider whether they were also wars otherwise in violation
of international law or in violation of treaties, agreements and assurances.]
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PAR1~

CHAPTER

IV.

B

THE MILITARY DoMINATION

OF jAPAN AND PREPARATION FOR WAR
[The Tribunal reviewed at length the internal political history of Japan between
1 January 1928 and the conclusion of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Italy
on 27 September 1940. The coming to power of military extremists in Japan
was linked with external aggression in Manchuria and China.]

v.

CHAPTER

jAPANESE AGGRESSION

AGAINST CHINA
[The history of Japanese military and economic penetration in Manchuria
and North China after 18 September 1931, and of the setting up and operation
of puppet governments in those areas, was reviewed.]

CHAPTER

VI.

jAPANESE AGGRESSION

AGAINST THE

U.S.S.R.

[The history of Japan's expectation, advocacy, planning and preparation of
war against the U. S. S. R., of Japanese subversion and sabotage, and of the
incidents at Lake Khassan in July 1938 and at Nomonhan in May 1939 was
reviewed.]

CHAPTER

VII.

THE pACIFIC wAR

[The history of the planning and preparation of the Pacific War between the
end of 1938 and 7 December 1941 and of its initiation on the latter date is set
out at length. The end of the chapter is reproduced.]

The Japanese Note Delivered in Washington
On December 7th 1941
Hague Convention No. III 1907, relative to the
opening of hostilities, provides by its first Article
"The Contracting Powers recognise that hostilities
between themselves must not commence without previous and explicit warning in the form either of a
reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with
conditional declaration of war". That Convention
was binding on Japan at all relevant times. Under
the Charter of the Tribunal the planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war in violation of
international law, treaties, agreements or assurances
is declared to be a crime. Many of the charges in
the indictment are based wholly or partly upon the
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view that the attacks against Britain and the United
States were delivered without previous and explicit
warning in the form either of a reasoned declaration
of war or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war. For reasons which are discussed elsewhere we have decided that it is unnecessary to deal
with these charges. In the case of counts of the indictment which charge conspiracy to wage aggressive
wars and wars in violation of international law,
treaties, agreements or assurances we have come to
the conclusion that the charge of conspiracy to wage
aggressive wars has been made out, that these acts
are already criminal in the highest degree, and that
it is unnecessary to consider whether the charge has
also been established in respect of the list of treaties,
agreements and assurances-including Hague Convention III-which the indictment alleges to have
been broken. We have come to a similar conclusion
in respect to the counts which allege the waging of
wars of aggression and wars in violation of international law, treaties, agreements and assurances.
With regard to the counts of the indictment which
charge murder in respect that wars were waged in
violation of Hague Convention No. III of 1907 or of
other treaties, we have decided that the wars in the
course of which these killings occurred were all wars
of aggression. The waging of such wars is the major
crime, since it involves untold killings, suffering and
misery. No good purpose would be served by convicting any defendant of that major crime and also of
"murder" eo nomine. Accordingly it is unnecessary
for us to express a concluded opinion upon the exact
extent of the obligation imposed by Hague Convention III of 1907. It undoubtedly imposes the obligation of giving previous and explicit warning before
hostilities are commenced, but it does not define the
period which must be allowed between the giving of
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this warning and the commencement of hostilities .
The position was before the framers of the Convention and has been the subject of controversy among
international lawyers ever since the Convention was
made. This matter of the duration of the period
between warning and hostilities is of course vital. If
that period is not sufficient to allow of the transmission of the warning to armed forces in outlying territories and to permit them to put themselves in a
state of defence they may be shot down without a
chance to defend themselves. It was the existence
of this controversy as to the exact extent of the
obligation imposed by the Convention which opened
the way for TOGO to advise the Liaison Conference of
30th November 1941 that various opinions were held
as to the period of warning which was obligatory,
that some thought it should be an hour and a half,
some an hour, some half an hour. The conference
left it to TOGO and the two Chiefs of Staff to fix the
time of the delivery of the Note to Washington with
the injunction that that time must not interfere with
the success of the surprise attack. In short they
decided to give notice that negotiations were broken
off at so short an interval before they commenced
hostilities as to ensure that the armed forces of Britain
and the United States at the points of attack could
not be warned that negotiations were broken off.
TOGO and the naval and military men, to whom the
task had been delivered, arranged that the Note
should be delivered in Washington at 1.00 p.m. on
7th December 1941. The first attack on Pearl
Harbor was delivered at 1.20 p.m. Had all gone
well, they would have allowed twenty minutes for
Washington to warn the armed forces at Pearl Harbor. But so anxious were they to ensure that the
attack would be a surprise that they allowed
no margin for contingencies. Thus, through the
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decoding and transcription of the Note in the Japanese
Embassy taking longer than had been estimated, the
Japanese Ambassadors did not in fact arrive with the
Note at Secretary Hull's office in Washington until
45 minutes after the attack had been delivered. As
for the attack on Britain at Kota Bharu, it was never
related to the time (1.00 p.m.) fixed for the delivery
of the Note at Washington. This fact has not been
adequately explained in the evidence. The attack
was delivered at 11.40 a.m. Washington time, one
hour and twenty minutes before the Note should
have been delivered if the Japanese Embassy at
Washington had been able to carry out the instructions it had received from Tokyo.
We have thought it right to pronounce the above
findings in fact for these rna tters have been the subject of much evidence and argument but mainly in
order to draw pointed attention to the defects of the
Convention as framed. It permits of a narrow construction and tempts the unprincipled to try to comply with the obligation thus narrowly construed
while at the same time ensuring that their attacks
shall come as a surprise. With the margin thus
reduced for the purpose of surprise no allowance can
be made for error, mishap or negligence leading to
delay in the delivery of the warning, and the possibility is high that the prior warning which the Convention makes obligatory will not in fact be given.
TOJO stated that the Japanese Cabinet had this in
view for they envisaged that the more the margin
was reduced the greater the possibility of mishap.

The Formal Declaration of War
The Japanese Privy Council's Committee of
Investigation did not begin the consideration of the
question of making a formal declaration of war upon
the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands
855422-50-7

90
until 7 .30 a .m ., 8th December (Tokyo time) -vvhen
it met in the Imperial Palace for that purpose at
that time. SHIMADA announced that the attacks
had been made upon Pearl Harbor and Kota Bharu;
and a bill declaring war on the United States and
Great Britain, which had been drafted at the residence of HOSHINO during the night, was introduced. In answer to a question during the deliberations on the bill, TOJO declared in referring to the
peace negotiations at Washington that, "those
negotiations were continued only for the sake of
strategy". TOJO also declared during the deliberations that war would not be declared on the Netherlands in view of future strategic convenience; and
that a declaration of war against Thailand would
not be made as negotiations were in progress between
Japan and Thailand for the conclusion of "an Alliance
Pact". The Bill was approved; and it was decided
to submit it to the Privy Council. The Privy Council
met at 10.50 a.m., 8th December 1941 and passed the
Bill. The Imperial Rescript declaring war against the
United States and Great Britain was issued between
11.40 and 12.00 a.m., 8th December 1941 (Washington time, 10.40 p.m. and 11.00 p.m., 7th December)
(London time, 2.40 a.m. and 3.00 a.m., 8th December). Having been attacked, the United States of
America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland declared war on Japan on
9th December 1941 (London and Washington, 8th
December). On the same day the Netherlands,
Netherlands East Indies, Australia, New Zealand,
South Africa, Free France, Canada and China also
declared war on Japan. The next day, MillO
stated in a conversation with the Chief of Operations
of the Army General Staff that the sending of Ambassador Kurusu to the United States was nothing
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more than a sort of camouflage of events leading to
the opening of hostilities.

Conclusions
It remains to consider the contention advanced on
behalf of the defendants that Japan's acts of aggression against France, her attack against the Netherlands, and her attacks on Great Britain and the
United States of America were justifiable measures
of self-defence. It is argued that these Powers took
such measures to restrict the economy of Japan that
she had no way of preserving the welfare and prosperity of her nationals but to go to war.
The measures which were taken by these Powers
to restrict Japanese trade were taken in an entirely
justifiable attempt to induce Japan to depart from a
course of aggression on which she had long been
embarked and upon which she had determined to
continue. Thus the United States of America gave
notice to terminate the Treaty of Commerce and
Navigation with Japan on 26th July 1939 after Japan
had seized Manchuria and a large part of the rest of
China and when the existence of the treaty had long
ceased to induce Japan to respect the rights and
interests of the nationals of the United States in
China. It was given in order that some other means
might be tried to induce Japan to respect these rights.
Thereafter the successive embargoes which were imposed on the export of rna terials to Japan were
imposed as it became clearer and clearer that Japan
had ~determined . to attack the territories and interests
of the Powers. They were imposed in an attempt to
induce Japan to depart from the aggressive policy
on which she had determined and in order that the
Powers might no longer supply Japan with the
materials to wage war upon them. In some cases,
as for example . in the case of the embargo on the
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export of oil from the United States of America to
Japan, these measures were also taken in order to
build up the supplies which were needed by the
nations who were resisting the aggressors. The
argument is indeed merely a repetition of Japanese
propaganda issued at the time she was preparing for
her wars of aggression. It is not easy to have patience with its lengthy repetition at this date when
documents are at length available which demonstrate
that Japan's decision to expand to the North, to the
West and to the South at the expense of her neighbors
was taken long before any economic measures were
directed against her and was never departed from.
The evidence clearly establishes contrary to the
contention of the defense that the acts of aggression
against France, and the attacks on Britain, the
United States of America and the Netherlands were
prompted by the desire to deprive China of any aid
in the struggle she was waging against Japan's aggression and to secure for Japan the possessions of her
neighbors in the South.
The Tribunal is of opinion that the leaders of
Japan in the years 1940 and 1941 planned to wage
wars of aggression against France in French IndoChina. They had determined to demand that
France cede to Japan the right to station troops and
the right to air bases and naval bases in French
Indo-China, and they had prepared to use force
against France if their demands were not granted.
They did make such demands upon France u ~ der
threat that they would use force to · obtain them, if
that should prove necessary. In her then situation
France was compelled to yield to the threat of force
and granted the demands.
The Tribunal also finds that a war of aggression
was waged against the Republic of France. The
occupation by Japanese troops of portions of French
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Indo-China, which Japan had forced France to
accept, did not remain peaceful. As the war situation, particularly in the Philippines, turned against
Japan the Japanese Supreme War Council in February
1945 decided to submit the following demands to the
Governor of French Indo-China: (1) that all French
troops and armed police be placed under Japanese
command, and (2) that all means of communication
and transportation necessary for military action be
placed under Japanese control. These demands
were presented to the Governor of French Indo-China
on 9th March 1945 in the form of an ultimatum
backed by the threat of military action. He was
given two hours to refuse or accept. He refused, and
the ·Japanese proceeded to enforce their demands by
military action. French troops and military police
resisted the attempt to disarm them. There was
fighting in Hanoi, Saigon, Phnom-Penh, Nhatrang,
and towards the Northern Frontier. We quote the
official Japanese account, "In the Northern frontiers
the Japanese had considerable losses. The Japanese
army proceeded to suppress French detachments in
remote places and contingents which had fled to the
mountains. In a month public order was reestablished except in remote places". The Japanese
Supreme War Council had decided that, if Japan's
demands were refused and military action was taken
to enforce them, "the two countries will not be considered as at war". This Tribunal finds that
Japanese actions at that time constituted the waging
of a war of aggression against the Republic of France.
The Tribunal is further of opinion that the attacks
which Japan launched on 7th December 1941 against
Britain, the United States of America and the Netherlands were wars of aggression. They were unprovoked attacks, prompted by the desire to seize the
possessions of these nations. Whatever may be the
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difficulty of stating a comprehensive definition of "a
war of aggression", attacks made with the above
motive cannot but be characterised as wars of
aggression.
It was argued on behalf of the defendants that,
in as much as the Netherlands took the initiative
in declaring war on Japan, the war which followed
cannot be described as a war of aggression by Japan.
The facts are that Japan had long planned to secure
for herself a dominant position in the economy of the
Nether lands East Indies by negotiation or by force of
arms if negotiation failed. By the middle of 1941 it
was apparent that the Netherlands would not yield to
the Japanese demands. The leaders of Japan then
planned and completed all the preparations for invading and seizing the Nether lands East Indies.
The orders issued to the Japanese army for this invasion have not been recovered, but the orders issued
to the Japanese navy on 5th November 1941 have
been adduced in evidence. This is the Combined
Fleet Operations Order No. 1 already referred to.
The expected enemies are stated to be the United
States, Great Britain and the Netherlands. The
order states that the day for the outbreak of w·ar will
be given in an Imperial General Headquarters order,
and that after 0000 hours on that day a state of war will
exist and the Japanese forces will commence operations according to the plan. The order of Imperial
General Headquarters was issued on lOth November
and it fixed 8th December (Tokyo time), 7th December (Washington time) as the date on which a
state of war would exist and operations would commence according to the plan. In the very first stage
of the operations so to be commenced it is stated that
the Southern Area Force will annihilate enemy fleets
in the Philippines, British Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies area. There is no evidence that
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the above order was ever recalled or altered in respect
to the above particulars. In these circumstances we
find in fact that orders declaring the existence of a
state of war and for the execution of a war of aggression by Japan against the Nether lands were in effect
from the early morning of 7th December 1941. The
fact that the Netherlands, being fully apprised of the
imminence of the attack, in self defence declared war
against Japan on 8th December and thus officially
recognised the existence of a state of war which had
been begun by Japan cannot change that war from a
war of aggression on the part of Japan in to something
other than that. In fact Japan did not declare war
against the Netherlands until 11th January 1942
when her troops landed in the Netherlands East
Indies. The Imperial Conference of 1st December
1941 decided that "Japan will open hostilities against
the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands." Despite this decision to open hostilities
against the Netherlands, and despite the fact that
orders for the execution of hostilities against the
Netherlands were already in effect, TOJO announced
to the Privy Council on 8th December (Tokyo time)
when they passed the Bill making a formal declaration
of war against the United States of America and
Britain that war would not be declared on the Netherlands in view of future strategic convenience. The
reason for this was not satisfactorily explained in
evidence. The Tribunal is inclined to the view that
it w~as dictated by the policy decided in October 1940
for the purpose of giving as little time as possible for
the Dutch to destroy oil wells. It has no bearing,
however, on the fact that Japan launched a war of
aggression against the Netherlands.
The position of Thailand is special. The evidence
bearing upon the entry of Japanese troops into
Thailand is meagre to a fault. It is clear that there
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was complicity between the Japanese leaders and the
leaders of Thailand in the years 1939 and 1940 when
Japan forced herself on France as mediator in the
dispute as to the border between French Indo-China
and Thailand. There is no evidence that the position of complicity and confidence between Japan
and Thailand, which was then achieved, was altered
before December 1941. It is proved that the
Japanese leaders planned to secure a peaceful passage
for their troops through Thailand into Malaya by
agreement with Thailand. They did not wish to
approach Thailand for such an agreement until the
moment when they were about to attack Malaya,
lest the news of the imminence of that attack should
leak out. The Japanese troops marched through the
territory of Thailand unopposed on 7th December
1941 (Washington time). The only evidence the
prosecution has adduced as to the circumstances of
that march is (1) a statement made to the Japanese
Privy Council between 10 a.m. and 11.00 a.m.
on 8th December 1941 (Tokyo time) that an agreement for the passage of the troops was being negotiated, (2) a Japanese broadcast announcement that
they had commenced friendly advancement into
Thailand on the afternoon of the 8th December
(Tokyo time) (Washington time, 7th December),
and that Thailand had facilitated the passage by
concluding an agreement at 12.30 p.m., and (3) a
conflicting statement, also introduced by the prosecution, that Japanese troops landed at Singora and
Patani in Thailand at 3.05 in the morning of 8th
December (Tokyo time). On 21st December 1941
Thailand concluded a treaty of alliance with Japan.
No witness on behalf of Thailand has complained of
Japan's actions as being acts of aggression. In these
circumstances we are left without reasonable certainty that the Japanese advance into Thailand was
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contrary to the wishes of the Government of Thailand
and the charges that the defendants initiated and
waged a war of aggression against the Kingdom of
Thailand remain unproved.
Count 31 charges that a war of aggression was
waged against the British Commonwealth of Nations.
The Imperial Rescript which was issued about 12
noon on 8th December 1941 (Tokyo time) states
"We hereby declare war on the United States of
America and the British Empire." There is a great
deal of lack of precision in the use of terms throughout
the many plans which were formulated for an attack
on British possessions. Thus such terms as
"Britain", "Great Britain", and "England"~~ are
used without discrimination and apparently used as
meaning the same thing. In this case there is no
doubt as to the entity which is designated by "the
British Empire". The correct title of that entity
is "the British Commonwealth of Nations". That
by the use of the term "the British Empire" they
intended the entity which is more correctly called
"the British Commonwealth of Nations" is clear
when we consider the terms of the Combined Fleet
Operations Order No. 1 already · referred to. That
order provides that a state of war will exist after
0000 hours X-Day, which was 8th December 1941
(Tokyo time), and that, the Japanese forces would
then commence operations. It is provided that in
the ~ very first phase of the operations the '~South
Seas Force" will be ready for the enemy fleet in the
Australia area. Later it was provided that "The
following are areas expected to be occupied or destroyed as quickly as operational conditions permit,
a, Eastern New Guiena, New Britain". These
were governed by the Commonwealth of Australia
under mandate from the League of Nations. The
areas to be destroyed or occupied are also stated to
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include "Strategic points in the Australia area".
Moreover, "important points in the Australian
coast" were to be mined. Now the Commonwealth
of Australia is not accurately described as being part
of "Great Britain", which is the term used in the
Combined Fleet Secret Operations Order No. 1, nor
is it accurately described as being part of "the
British Empire", which is the term used in the
Imperial Rescript. It is properly designated as
part of "the British Commonwealth of Nations".
It is plain therefore that the entity against which
hostilities were to be directed and against which
the declaration of war was directed was "the British
"Commonwealth of Nations", and Count 31 is wellfounded when it charges that a war of aggression was
waged against the British Commonwealth of Nations.
It is charged in Count 30 of the Indictment that
a war of aggression was waged against the Commonwealth of the Philippines. The Philippines during
the period of the war were not a completely sovereign
state. So far as in tern a tional relations were concerned they were part of the United States of
America. It is beyond doubt that a war of aggression was waged against the people of the Philippines.
For the sake of technical accuracy we shall consider
the aggression against the people of the Philippines
as being a part of the war of aggression waged against
the United States of America.
CHAPTER VIII. .CoNVENTIONAL WAR CRIMES
(ATROCITIES)
After carefully examining and considering all the
evidence we find that it is not practicable in a
judgment such as this to state fully the mass of oral
and documentary evidence presented; for a complete
statement of the scale and character of the atrocities
reference must be had to the record of the trial.
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The evidence relating to atrocities and other
Conventional War Crimes presented before the
Tribunal establishes that from the opening of the
war in China until the surrender of Japan in August
1945 torture, murder, rape and other cruelties of the
most inhumane and barbarous character were freely
practiced by the Japanese Army and Navy. During
a period of several months the Tribunal heard evidence, orally or by affidavit, from witnesses who
testified in detail to atrocities committed in all
theaters of war on a scale so vast, yet following so
common a pattern in all theaters, that only one
conclusion is possible-the atrocities were either
secretly ordered or wilfully permitted by the J apanese Government or individual members thereof and
by the leaders of the armed forces.
[There follows a detailed rev iew of Jap anese atrocities and instances of mistreatment of prisoners of war proved before the Tribunal. The Japanese
system for handling prisoners of war, Allied protests against mistreatment of
prisoners, and Jap anese condonation and concealment of ill-treatment of
prisoners of war and civilian internees are reviewed.]

PART C
CHAPTER IX.

FINDINGs oN CouNTs

OF THE INDICTlVIENT

In Count 1 of the Indictment it is charged that
all the defendants together with other persons participated in the formulation or execution of a common
plan or conspiracy. The object of that common
plan is alleged to have been that Japan should secure
the military, naval, political and economic domination of East Asia and of the Pacific and Indian
Oceans, and of all countries and islands therein or
bordering thereon, and for that purpose should,
alone or in combination with other countries having
similar objects, wage a war or wars of aggress1on
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against any country or countries which might oppose
that purpose.
There are undoubtedly declarations by some of
those who are alleged to have participated in the
conspiracy which coincide with the above grandiose
statement, but in our opinion it has not been proved
that these were ever more than declarations of the
aspirations of individuals. Thus, for example, we
do not think the conspirators ever seriously resolved
to attempt to secure the domination of North and
South America. So far as the wishes of the conspirators crystallised into a concrete common plan we
are of opinion that the territory they had resolved
that Japan should dominate was confined to East
Asia, the vVestern and South Western Pacific Ocean
and the Indian Ocean, and certain of the islands in
these oceans. We shall accordingly treat Count 1
as if the charge had been limited to the above object.
We shall consider in the first place whether a conspiracy with the above object has been proved to
have existed.
Already prior to 1928 Okawa, one of the original
defendents, who has been discharged from this trial
on account of his present mental state, was publicly
advocating that Japan should extend her territory
on the Continent of Asia by the threat or, if necessary, by use of military force. He also advocated
that Japan should seek to dominate Eastern Siberia
and the South Sea Islands. He predicted that the
course he advocated must result in a war between
the East and the West, in which Japan would be the
champion of the East. He was encouraged and
aided in his advocacy of this plan by the Japanese
General Staff. The object of this plan as stated was
substantially the object of the conspiracy, as we
have defined it. In our review of the facts we have
noticed many subsequent declarations of the con-
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spirators as to the object of the conspiracy . These
do not vary in any material respect from this early
declaration by Okawa.
Already when Tanaka was premier, from 1927 to
1929, a party of military men, with Okawa and other
civilian supporters, was advocating this policy of
Okawa's that Japan should expand by the use of
force. The conspiracy was now in being. It remained in being until Japan's defeat in 1945. The
immediate question when Tanaka was premier was
whether Japan should attempt to expand her influence on the continent-beginning with Manchuriaby peaceful penetration, as Tanaka and the members
of his Cabinet wished, or whether that expansion
should be accomplished by the use of force if necessary, as the conspirators advocated. It was essential
that the conspirators should have the support and
control of the nation. This was the beginning of
the long struggle between the conspirators, who advocated the attainment of their object by force, and
those politicians and latterly those bureaucrats, who
advocated Japan's expansion by peaceful measures
or at least by a more discreet choice of the occasions
on which force should be employed. This struggle
culminated in the conspirators obtaining control of
the organs of government of Japan and preparing
and regimenting the nation's mind and material
resources for wars of aggression designed to achieve
the object of the conspiracy. In overcoming the
opposition the conspirators employed methods which
were entirely unconstitutional and at times wholly
ruthless. Propaganda and persuasion won many to
their side, but military action abroad without
Cabinet sanction or in defiance of Cabinet veto,
assassination of opposing leaders, plots to overthrow
by force of arms Cabinets which refused to cooperate
with them, and even a military revolt which seized
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the capital and attempted to overthrow the government were part of the tactics whereby the conspirators came ultimately to dominate the Japanese
polity.
As and when they felt strong enough to overcome
opposition at home and latterly when they had
finally overcome all such opposition the conspirators
carried out in succession the attacks necessary to
effect their ultimate object, that Japan should dominate the Far East. In 1931 they launched a war
of aggression against China and conquered Manchuria and Jehol. By 1934 they had commenced to
infiltrate in to North China, garrisoning the land
and setting up puppet governments designed to
serve their purposes. From 1937 onwards they
continued their aggressive war against China on a
vast scale, overrunning and occupying much of the
country, setting up puppet governments on the above
model, and exploiting China's economy and natural
resources to feed the Japanese military and civilian
needs.
In the meantime they had long been planning and
preparing a war of aggression which they proposed
to launch against the U.S.S.R. The intention was
to seize that country's Eastern territories when a
favourable opportunity occurred. They had also
long recognized that their exploitation of East Asia
and their designs on the islands in the Western and
South Western Pacific would bring them into conflict
with the United States of America, Britain, France
and the Netherlands who would defend their threatened interests and territories. They planned and
prepared for war against these countries also.
The conspirators brought about Japan's alliance
with Germany and Italy, whose policies were as
aggressive as their own, and whose support they
desired both in the diplomatic and military fields,
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for their aggressive actions in China had drawn on
Japan the condemnation of the League of Nations
and left her friendless in the councils of the world.
Their proposed attack on the U.S.S.R. was postponed from time to time for various reasons, among
which were (1) Japan's preoccupation with the war
in China, which was absorbing unexpectedly large
military resources, and (2) Germany's pact of nonaggression with the U.S.S.R. in 1939, which for the
time freed the U.S.S.R. from threat of attack on
her Western frontier, and might have allowed her to
devote the bulk of her strength to the defence of her
Eastern territories if Japan had attacked her.
Then in the year 1940 came Germany's great
military successes on the continent of Europe. For
the time being Great Britain, France and the
Netherlands were powerless to afford adequate protection to their interests and territories in the Far
East. The military preparations of the United
States were in the initial stages. It seemed to the
conspirators that no such favourable opportunity
could readily recur of realising that part of their
objective which sought Japan's domination of SouthWest Asia and the islands in the Western and South
Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. After prolonged negotiations with the United States of
America, in which they refused to disgorge any substantial part of the fruits they had seized as the
result of their war of aggression against China, on
7tli December 1941 the conspirators launched a war
of aggression against the United States and the
British Commonwealth. They had already issued
orders declaring that a state of war existed between
Japan and the Netherlands as from 00.00 hours on
7th December 1941. They had previously secured
a jumping-off place for their attacks on the Philippines, Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies by
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forcing their troops in to French Indo-China under
threat of military action if this facility was refused
to them. Recognising the existence of a state of
war and faced by the imminent threat of invasion of
her Far Eastern territories, which the conspirators
had long planned and were now about to execute,
the Netherlands in self-defence declared war on
Japan.
These far-reaching plans for waging wars of aggression, and the prolonged and intricate preparation for
and waging of these wars of aggression were not the
work of one man. They were the work of many
leaders acting in pursuance of a common plan for
the achievement of a common object. That common
object, that they should secure Japan's domination
by preparing and waging wars of aggression, was a
criminal object. Indeed no more grave crimes can
be conceived of than a conspiracy to wage a war of
aggression or the waging of a war of aggression, for
the conspiracy threatens the security of the peoples
of the world, and the waging disrupts it. The
probable result of such a conspiracy, and the inevitable result of its execution is that death and
suffering will be inflicted on countless human beings.
The Tribunal does not find it necessary to consider
whether there was a conspiracy to wage wars in
violation of the treaties, agreements and assurances
specified in the particulars annexed to Count 1.
The conspiracy to wage wars of aggression was already criminal in the highest degree.
The Tribunal finds that the existence of the
criminal conspiracy to wage wars of aggression as
alleged in Count 1, with the limitation as to object
already mentioned, has been proved.
The question whether the defendants or any of
them participated in that conspiracy will be considered when we deal with the individual cases.
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The conspiracy existed for and its execution occupied a period of many years . Not all of the conspirators were parties to it at the beginning, and
some of those who were parties to it had ceased to
be active in its execution before the end. All of
those who at any time were parties to the criminal
conspiracy or who at any time with guilty knowledge
played a part in its execution are guilty of the charge
contained in Count 1.
In view of our finding on Count 1 it is unnecessary
to deal with Counts 2 and 3, which charge the
formulation or execution of conspiracies with objects
more limited than that which we have found proved
under Count 1, or with Count 4, which charges the
same conspiracy as Count 1 but with more specification.
Count 5 charges a conspiracy wider in extent and
with even more grandiose objects than that charged
in Count 1. We are of opinion that although some
of the conspirators clearly desired the achievement
of these grandiose objects nevertheless there is not
sufficient evidence to justify a finding that the conspiracy charged in Count 5 has been proved.
For the reasons given in an earlier part of this
judgment we consider it unnecessary to make any
pronouncement on Counts 6 to 26 and 37 to 53.
There remain therefore only Counts 27 to 36 and 54
and 55, in respect of which we now give our findings.
Counts 27 to 36 charge the crime of waging wars
of aggression and wars in violation of in tern a tional
law, treaties, agreements and assurances against the
countries named in those counts.
In the statement of facts just concluded we have
found that wars of aggression were waged against
all those countries with the exception of the Commonwealth of the Philippines (Count 30) and the
Kingdom of Thailand (Count 34). With reference
855422-50-8
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to the Philippines, as we have heretofore stated,
that Commonwealth during the period of the war
was not a completely sovereign State and so far as
in tern a tional relations were concerned it was a part
of the United States of America. We further stated
that it is beyond doubt that a war of aggression was
waged in the Philippines, but for the sake of technical accuracy we consider the aggressive war in the
Philippines as being a part of the war of aggression
waged against the United States of America.
Count 28 charges the waging of a war of aggression
against the Republic of China over a lesser period
of time than that charged in Count 27. Since we
hold that the fuller charge contained in Count 2 7
has been proved we shall make no pronouncement
on Count 28.
Wars of aggression having been proved, it is unnecessary to consider whether they were also wars
otherwise in violation of in tern a tional law or in violation of treaties, agreements and assurances. The
Tribunal finds therefore that it has been proved
that wars of aggression were waged as alleged in
Counts 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35 and 36.
Count 54 charges ordering, authorising and permitting the commission of Conventional War Crimes.
Count 55 charges failure to take adequate steps to
secure the observance and prevent breaches of
conventions and laws of war in respect of prisoners
of war and civilian internees. We find that there
have been cases in which crimes under both these
Counts have been proved.
Consequent upon the foregoing findings, we propose to consider the charges against individual
defendants in respect only of the following Counts:
Numbers 1, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 54 and 55.

